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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines a proposal to index the Federal
procurement small purchase thresholds. The indexation mechanism
within the Congressional legislative process and the indexing
mechanism used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
adjust procurement thresholds are examined. An index is
selected and an appropropriate indexing mechanism is developed.
The indexing proposals viability is tested using the analytical
framework proposed by R. Kent Weaver in Automatic Government:
The Politics of Indexation. Conclusions and recommendations on
the indexing proposal are provided in the final chapter. A
draft legislative bill is provided at Appendix A.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ISSUE
In November 1982, Public Law 97-86 established the small
purchase threshold at $2S,O00, with a non-competitive small
purchase threshold of $1,000. On L June 1967, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (P&L) issued a class deviation to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), increasing the
non-competitive threshold to S2,SO0 For a test period of one
year. During the test period, a thesis was written by LCDR R.L.
Howard analyzing the cost and benefit of raising the threshold
from S1,OO0 to 52,500 at two Navy contracting activities. LCDR
Howard concluded that the cost of competing small purchase
procurements between 51,000 and S2,500 was over three million
dollars, while the cost savings realized from competing these
procurements would be only two hundred thousand dollars. These
costs resulted in a net cost of competition of 2.B million
dollars. [Ref. 1:p. '2]
The conclusion to be drawn from his thesis is that
competition may cost more than it provides in savings For small
dollar value, commercially available items. Since the
government is not a private enterprise, this cost of competition
must be continually balanced against the importance of public
trust in the impartiality and equity of the government
procurement system.
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Competition requirements within the Federal procurement
system are determined by the Congress. Only four times over the
past 50 years has Congress enacted legislation revising the
non-competitive small purchase and small purchase thresholds.
For periods of between Five and 16 years these thresholds have
remained constant, yet the cost of goods in the economy did not.
Graph 1.1 illustrates the lack of correlation between the
economy and the dollar thresholds over the last 50 years.
GRAPH I.1
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During the periods between enactment of Congressional
legislation, inflation reduced the buying power of these
thresholds to the level where the vast majority of small
purchase requirements required competitive bidding. Procurement
managers then recommended that thresholds be increased. The
recommendation wended its way through the bureaucracy of the
executive branch to the legislative branch and eventually
public law revising the thresholds would be passed. Since
over 98% of all DoD purchasing transactions fall within the
$25,000 small purchase threshold, the lack of systemic ability
to routinely adjust the thresholds as economic conditions
warrant thwarts procurement efficiency [Ref. 2).
LCDR Howard recognized the need to address this problem.
His thesis recommended that ". . .the small purchase
non-competitive threshold should be a rate that can be adjusted
annually to reflect current economic indices." [Ref. 1:p. 45]
The issue, then, is to develop a proposed leg'slative bill which
provides a mechanism for adjusting the small purchase thresholds
on a periodic basis as the economy changes, yet still allows
Congress to retain its authority to legislatively determine the
appropriate level of competition for Federal procurement.
B. BACKGROUND
Within the Federal government, procurement policy and
procedures are established by the Federal Acquision Regulation
3
(FAR). The FAR divides Government procurement by dollar
threshold into three major categories:
TABLE 1.1
FAR PROCUREMENT CATEGORIES
CATEGORY DOLLAR THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
Non-competitive S2,SOO* No competition required.
Small Purchase or less Price must be
determined to be fair
and reasonable.
Purchases to be equally
distributed among
vendors.
Small Purchase greater than Minimum of three
52,S00 but quotations must be
less than solicited to determine




Other than greater than Must be procured
Small Purchase $25,000 through formal
contracting procedures.
* A class deviation to the FAR raised this level From
$1,000 to 52,S00 on 4 June 1S87. The deviation was issued by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense For Procurement and Logistics.
The dollar thresholds which establis:0 the categories of
Federal procurement arb established by Congress. The Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947 established the First
regulations to guide government procurement. The Federal
Property and Administrative Service Act of 1949 established the
First small purchase procurement dollar threshold oF $1,000 as
the minimum procurement requiring formal contracting procedures.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) established
4i
policy and procedures For implementing the two Congressional
acts. The ASPR established the simplified small purchase
procedure and established a threshold of S250 as the first
non-competitive small purchase threshold. This threshold
represented 25 percent of the small purchase threshold of 11,000.
The two thresholds remained constant until 195, when
Congress enacted Public Law 8S-800 which increased the small
purchase threshold to 52,S00 while leaving the non-competitive
small purchase threshold at S250. This level represented only
ten percent of the revised small purchase threshold.
The two thresholds remained constant for 16 years until
July 1974 when Public Law 93-3S6 increased the small purchase
threshold to S10,000 and the non-competitive small purchase
threshold to SSO0. The non-competitive small purchase threshold
now represented only Five percent of the small purchase
threshold.
Eight years passed with no change to the thresholds. Then,
in November 1982, Public Law 97-6 increased the small purchase
threshold to S2S,000 and the non-competitive small purchase
threshold to 51,000. The 51,000 threshold represented only four
percent of the small purchase threshold.
In June 196, the Contracting Branch of the Naval Weapons
Center China Lake Supply Departmient submitted a Model
Installations Program Initiative (MIPI) to increase the
non-competitive small purchase threshold from 51,000 to 52,500.
This recommendation was forwarded along with others supported by
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the Naval Supply Systems Commard to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Procurement in January, 1987. [Ref. 3]
On 4 June 1987, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (P&L) issued
a class deviation to the FAR, increasing the non-competitive
small purchase threshold from $1,000 to $2,500 for a test period
of one year. This revision established the non-competitive
small purchase threshold at ten percent of the small purchase
threshold.
Following the test period, the deviation was formalized
by the ASO (P&L) as a permanent deviation to the FAR. The
current DoD thresholds are S25,000 for small purchase and 52,500
for non-competitive small purchase procurements. No
Congressional legislation has been enacted to ratify the S2,500
non-competitive small purchase threshold to date.
C. OBJECTIUE
The purpose of this thesis is to develop proposed
legislation to tie the small purchase procurement thresholds to
an economic indicator and provide a mechanism by which
thresholds can be revised annually during the Congressional
budget process without passage of unique legislation.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Research Question:
What is the optimal phraseology of a legislative bill to index




What economic indicator(s) are most appropriate for indexing
the small purchase procurement thresholds?
Can the indexing methodology currently utilized within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization be utilized by our Federal
Government to tie our procurement thresholds to economic
change?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research data were collected through telephone and personal
interviews, literature search and personal experience as a
Contracting Officer within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Interviews were conducted with personnel at Naval
Supply Systems Command, staff of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Procurement, staff members of the House of
Representatives and Senate and other field level contracting
personnel.
The literature review included Congressional Legislation,
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Naval Postgraduate
School Masters Theses, newspaper articles and periodicals.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This chapter provided a synopsis of the current Department
of Defense procurement threshold methodology. Chapter II
provides a synopsis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
mechanism For indexing procurement thresholds with an economic
indicator. Chapter III provides an analysis of economic
indicators and their applicability as indexers for the
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procurement thresholds. Chapter IU provides an analysis of the
selected indexing methodology. Chapter U consists of the
proposed legislation and recommendations from the research.
G. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis will present, analyze and evaluate the mechanism
by which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization uses an economic
indicator to adjust procurement thresholds. Other economic
indexers will be evaluated for their appropriateness. A
proposed legislative bill will be developed utilizing the most
effective economic indicator to adjust the small purchase
procurement thresholds for the Federal procurement system.
Non-DoD procurement was not included in the scope of this
effort. It is assumed the reader is familiar with standard
Department of Defense acquisition concepts and terminology as
well as the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its associated
policies.
a
II. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
A. ORGANIZATION AND BUDGETARY PROCESS
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed
shortly after World War II to preserve peace in Europe and to
protect the international shipping lanes of the Atlantic. Its
membership consists of 15 nations, with the United States a
charter member.
The governing body of NATO is headquartered in Brussels,
Belgium and is called the General Council. The General Council
operates in a manner similar to the United States Senate in that
each member nation has an equal number of votes. However, the
majority rule utilized in the Senate is not used within the NATO
General Council. The General Council must have unanimous
approval in order to pass a motion.
The budgetary process within NATO is also similar to the
system used within the Department of Defense. Instead of
the Six Year Defense Plan, the three Major NATO Commmands
(MNCs) submit a Ten Year Budgetary Plan to the Military Budgetary
Committee (MBC) of the General Council. The NATO budget is
appropriated annually within a calendar year fiscal system.
The Military Budgetary Committee screens the annual budgets
and adjusts funding as appropriate. Once the budgets have been
screened and authorized by the MBC, the General Council reviews
the entire NATO budget and votes upon its appropriation. Each
9
member nation's contribution to the NATO budget is determined by
the percentage of the member nation's GNP as compared to the
1S member nations' total GNP.
The legislative and budgetary organization of NATO is based
upon annual appropriation of funds within a unicameral system.
There are distinct similarities between the United States
legislative and budgetary systems and those of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
B. PROCUREMENT WITHIN NATO
There are also similarities between the NATO and Federal
procurement systems. While the Federal procurement system
regulations are contained within the FAR, NATO procurement
regulations are outlined in a 31 article section of the NATO
Financial Regulations (NFR). Both procurement systems establish
levels of procurement competition by dollar thresholds. A
comparison of the NFR and FAR procurement thresholds is provided
in Table II.1.
Both procurement systems set a procurement dollar threshold
below which no competition is required. The systems also
establish a threshold below which limited competition of three
bids is required. The NATO system specifies Invitation for Bid
(IFB) or Request for Proposal (RFP) usage at certain dollar
thresholds, while the FAR system relies upon the Contracting
Officer to select the most appropriate solicitation vehicle.
The FAR procurement system does not require international
10
procurement, while the NATO system does due to its international
membership.
Despite some differences in the concerns and organization
of the United States and NATO systems, a strong parallel
relationship is apparent.
TABLE II.1
COMPETITIUE PROCUREMENT DOLLAR THRESHOLDS
FAR PROCUREMENT THRESHOLD NATO
<$2,500 Non-Competitive <Level A-
Small Purchase 1/2 monthly
(no competition required) pay of NATO
civilian
(B-2 grade)
Small Purchase >Level A
(three oral bids required) but
>52,500 <Level B-2A
but
<$25,000 Small Purchase >Level B
(three written bids required) but
<Level C-2(A + B)
Full and Open Competition >Level C
(IFB required in NATO) but
>S25,000 <Level D-2(B + C)
(IFB or
RFP) Full and Open Competition >Level D
(RFP required in NATO) but
<Level E-2(C + D)
Full and Open Competition >Level E
(International Competition
required in NATO)
C. THE INDEXING MECHANISM
There is one significant difference between the FAR and the
NATO procurement systems. In the United States, procurement
thresholds are revised at irregular and infrequent intervals.
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The revision requires passage of unique legislation through both
houses of Congress. Within the NATO procurement system, the
five procurement dollar thresholds have been related to one
another, with the lowest, Level A, tied to the monthly salary of
a NATO civil service employee. Each year, the MBC of NATO
examines the NATO civil servent pay scale and authorizes
increases as economic change indicates their appropriateness.
Since Level A is equivalent to one half the monthly pay of
a particular grade NATO civil servant, a pay increase also
increases Level A which is the non-competitive small purchase
threshold within NATO. Since the other procurement thresholds
CLevels B, C, D, and E) are dependent upon Level A, a change in
Level A causes a change in all other NATO procurement
thresholds. Utilizing this mechanism, the NATO General Council
is able to change NFR procurement thresholds as economic
conditions warrant without passage of unique legislation.
The mechanism which NATO utilizes to revise procurement
thresholds is called indexation. Indexation of the procurement
thresholds provides a vehicle for periodic adjustment of the
thresholds to prevent loss of buying power. The indexation also
provides a vehicle for the NATO General Council to control the
amount of change to the thresholds, as the Council authorizes the
civil service pay scale each year. The NATO indexing system has
been used since 19S7 when the NATO Financial Regulations were
adopted by the General Council.
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The NATO indexation mechanism provides a proven method by
which the United States could index procurement dollar thresholds
within our own Federal procurement system. The use of the
indexation mechanism within the United States legislative and
budgetary process will now be examined.
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III. INDEXATION WITHIN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. THE CONCEPT OF INDEXATION
The concept of indexation is a simple one. First, there is
a base, or program standard at a specified point in time. The
base maw be an entitlement, a program budget, an income tax
bracket or even a regulation. Second, there is an index which
measures changes in wages or prices since the base was set. The
index may be a very general one, such as the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), or it may be sector-specific as in the parity
indexes used to set dairy-price supports. The process of
indexing consists of adjusting the base at regular intervals by
multiplying it by the percentage change of the index in relation
to the base period.
B. EXTENT OF INDEXATION
Indexing of Federal programs is not a recent phenomenon.
In 1861, a statute provided that "wages to be paid all employees
in (navy) yards shall be, as near as may be, the average price
paid to employees of the same grade in private shipyards, to be
determined by the commandant of the navy yard." [Ref. 4:p. SS
This prevailing wage concept was later applied in the
Davis-Bacon Act of 1931.
14i
Specific Federal indexing to well-defined indexes is,
for the most part, a post World War II development [Ref. 4:p.
SS].
One of the most remarkable public policy developments in
the past twenty years in the United States is the extent to
which policy makers have surrendered- at least formally-
control over public policy decisions. The vehicle For this
public policy revolution is indexation: automatic adjustment
of public policy output for inflation. ERef. 4:p. 13
The number of indexed programs grew from 17 in 1966 to more than
90 in 1980 [Ref. S:p. xiii3. 30 percent of the Federal budget
was directly indexed to measures such as the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) by 1980, and another 20 percent was indirectly
indexed [Ref. 6:p. 16). The dollar amounts involved are
significant since a one percent increase in the CPI in 1981 was
estimated to force more than a three billion dollar increase in
direct and indirect Federal expenditures due to indexation [Ref.
7 :p. 1].
Large programs such as Social Security have been indexed.
Small programs such as pensions for former presidents have also
been indexed. There are four major sectors of government
activity which utilize indexing. Obviously indexing is quite
common in Federal benefit and social service programs. Within
the second sector, that of purchasing programs, indexing is used
fairly extensively within limited areas. Third, within the area
of government regulation, only limited use of indexing has been
achieved. Revenue in the form of income tax brackets is the
fourth government sector in which indexing has been utilized.
1s
As might be expected, indexing is especially heavy in areas
where program standards are set in nominal dollar amounts.
For purposes of this study, Federal benefit and social
service programs, purchasing programs, and regulatory programs
will be examined, as they correlate most closely to the premise
of indexing the small purchase thresholds within Federal
government procurement. Within each area, programs which are
indexed or were examined for indexation will be investigated for
index type and execution of the indexation process.
C. SECTOR: BENEFIT AND SOCIAL SERUICE PROGRAMS
Federal programs which provide benefits to individuals
constitute the vast majority of indexed Federal programs. These
programs can be divided into three main categories: social
insurance programs, benefit and social service programs, and
Federal retirement programs.
Social insurance programs provide income support to specific
sectors of the population. Social Security and the Social
Security Disability Programs are the keystone programs of
this type. The only program within this category which is not
indexed is unemployment insurance, whose benefits and
eligibility criteria are regulated by the states. Of the
indexed programs, all are tied to the CPI with two exceptions.
Railroad retirement is tied to Social Security benefits and
therefore indirectly related to the CPI. The coal miners'
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disability program is tied to the salary level of a Federal GS-2
eriployee ( a Federal purchase indexed program).
Benefit and social service programs, such as Ueterans'
pensions, supplemental security income, and the Earned Income
Tax Credit are also indexed to the CPI or to social security
benefits (thus indirectly to the CPI). Benefit programs such as
Ueterans' health care and Medicaid are indirectly tied to the
CPI via the veterans' pension percentage increase and
supplemental security income. The Food stamp program, another
benefit type, is indexed to the Thrifty food plan, an index
based on the cost of a nutritious, low cost diet within the
marketplace.
Finally, Federal retirement programs including civil
service, military, and Federal employee retirement are all
indexed to the CPI.
Of all major indexed programs in the sector of Federal
benefit and social service, only one is not indexed either
directly or indirectly to the CPI.
The Consumer Price Index is a marketbasket of goods
including medical costs, housing costs, and the prices of
consumer goods in the marketplace. Simply stated, the CPI shows
what a consumer dollar will buy in today's marketplace as
compared to what the same dollar could buy a certain number of
Wears ago. The CPI seems an ideal index for use in the Federal
benefits and social services sector, since this sector provides
monetary support for either retired, disabled or disadvantaged
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consumers. The indexation of these programs to the CPI ensures
that this Financial support keeps pace with changing economic
conditions in the marketplace.
Opponents of the CPI cite several inadequacies of its use
as an index. First, the CPI tends to overstate inflation because
the marketbasket of goods it uses is changed infrequently.
While the CPI is an accurate measure of changing prices For its
goods and services, it does not take into account the changing
patterns of consumer preference- specifically shifts to cheaper
substitutes when the prices of some products increase relative
to others. IF, For example, avocados are two dollars each, a
consumer may choose to have cucumber, at twenty-Five cents each,
in his salad instead.
Second, many have argued that the general CPI index does
not accurately reflect the purchasing patterns of specific
population groups to which it is applied. A classic example of
this problem concerns the elderly. The elderly spend more on
average For medical care than the rest of the population, and
thus will be more significantly affected by increases in medical
care costs than the population viewed as a whole.
Third, the treatment of homeownership costs in the CPI was
clearly defective For many years, leading to a serious
overstatement of the inflation rate. The CPI did not take into
account that a portion of the expenditure for home ownership was
investment in an appreciating asset. The heavy weighting given
to mortgage interest rates in the CPI also caused the index to be
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extremely volatile. These problems were corrected in 1983, but
the programs which had been indexed against the CPI were not
adjusted to reflect this overstatement. The Congressional
Budget Office estimated that if the Personal Consumption
Expenditure Implicit Price Deflator Index had been used vice the
CPI since 197S, Federal spending on benefit programs would have
been 12 billion dollars less in 1981 alone. [Ref. 4:p. 10)
Last, the CPI does not measure changes in the overall
living standard of the population, primarily improvements due to
productivity increases, as a wage-based index would do. This
results in the benefits indexed by the CPI maintaining the
beneficiaries' standard of living without the improvement which
would be experienced by the general population over time.
Attempts were made to minimize the CPI overstatment of
inflaticn by adjusting Federal programs indexed to it only
when the CPI increased by more than three percent in an annual
period. Most of these provisions were repealed in 1986, after
the revision of the home ownership aspect of the CPI in 1983.
The CPI is a Familiar index and despite its overly general market
basket and tendency to overstate the effects of inflation
it remains the primary indexer within the Federal government
todaW. In the next sector of Federal government activity,
examples of sector specific indexes (with their own inherent
drawbacks) will be examined.
19
0. SECTOR: PURCHASING PROGRAMS
This sector deals with the prices paid by the government for
goods and services. Indexation within this sector has been
limited to three areas: medical care vendor payment (Medicare
schedule B maximum payments), commodity price support programs,
and Federal pay.
Indexation of medical care occurred due to the failure of
earlier pricing mechanisms to contain the rapid growth of
medicare expenditures. Initially, Medicare reimbursed hospitals
and physicians on the basis of "customary, prevailing, and
reasonable" rates [Ref. B:p. 2233. These prevailing rates
increased so rapidly that in 1972 Congress adopted an additional
check on physicians' fees for medicare services. The new
provision capped charges at the level of the "prevailing rate"
in 1972, adjusted by the percentage change in the Medicare
Economic Index. This index is a composite of physician' fees
and general earnings levels and was developed specifically to
index the Medicare program [Ref. 9:p. 463. By using physicians'
fees and their salaries to determine the "right" amount for the
physicians to charge for their servicas, the government controls
the price of medical services in the marketplace for medicare
recipients, instead of allowing the forces of supply and demand
to establish the price. This indexation policy generated
significant controversy during its legislation.
Indexation of the commodity support programs was developed
for two reasons. First, some commodity price support programs
20
arer technically considered loans by the government to enable
producers to continue to produce items whose market price is
less than the production price. In other words, commodity price
supports help to maintain a certain standard of living for a
particular client group ERef. 4:p. 1463. Secondly, through
use of price supports the government is able to stabilize the
supply of the commodities, by smoothing out fluctuations in
prices paid to the producers or farmers. The most striking
example of commodity price support is the dairy price support
program. First legislated in 1933, this program established a
parity index- a complicated indexing mechanism based primarily
on the prices farmers receive for their commodities and the
prices they pay for goods and services. "Parity" is defined as
the purchasing power per hundredweight of milk during 1910-1914.
This period was chosen because it represented a prosperous
period in the history of Amsrican agriculture. [Ref. 4:p. 148]
In 1949, additional legislation authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to set the dairy price support within a range of 7S
to 90 percent of parity. This allowed the secretary to adjust
quickly to changing market conditions. In actuality, the
secretary usually set the price at the minimum allowed by
Congress. The dairy price support program continued relatively
unchanged until 1981, when escalating dairy production with
stagnant demand resulted in the dairy price support program
consuming over 37 percent of Federal price support expenditures
in 1980 and close to 47 percent in 1981. [Ref. 4:pp. 146-157)
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Within the next five years, the Congess passed five pieces
of legislation which reduced the support to 60 percent of
parity, introduced a whole herd buy out program, instituted
penalties of parity reduction for over production and finally
removed the indexing provision completely. One of the primary
reasons For removal of dairy price support indexation was the
desire of the administration For a simpler, more believable
index than parity. The new dairy specific index proposed by the
National Milk Producers Federation was not found acceptable and
the administration proposed direct payment to producers for the
difference between the market price of milk and a declining
percentage of the market price over the preceding three years.
Photographs of warehouses full of government owned cheese made
the administration aware that there was something seriously wrong
with an indexing provision which resulted in the government
providing artificial demand for a product. [Ref. 4:pp. 1S8-1723
The third area of the Federal purchasing program sector is
that of Federal pay. Military pay was indexed in 1967. General
schedule civil service pay was indexed in 1970. Executive,
Judicial, and legislative pay were indexed in 197S. General
schedule civil service pay is indexed to salaries for similar
positions in the private sector. The other two areas, military
and executive, are Indexed to the average increase in general
schedule civil service pay. A provision exists for both the
general schedule and executive areas which allows the President
to submit to the Congress a pay proposal different from that
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indicated by the index. In each year since 1978, the President
has submitted a lower alternative to the full comparability
increase indicated by the index and Congress has appropriated
funds accordingly. [Ref. 1O:p. 28-31)
Federal pay indexing is based on an index of private sector
salaries which was developed specifically for use as an indexing
mechanism for the pay programs. The Medicare Economic Index and
the dairy parity index were also developed to target specific
sectors of the marketplace. It would seem that these indexes
would be far more acceptable as an accurate means of evaluating
economic change than the general CPI; however the evidence does
not support this postulate.
The Medicare Economic Index is a mechanism by which Congress
controls the price of medical care for a population segment,
disregarding the forces of supply and demand. The dairy price
parity index resulted in the government providing artificial
demand for a good rather than stabilizing the supply of the
commodity. Finally, the Federal pay indexing mechanism provides
a vehicle for increasing pay to the level which the President
believes the traffic (Congress) will bear. The index provides a
"no greater than" definition, rather than the percentage figure
by which pay should be increased.
Therefore, sector specific indexes can drive the market
place rather than reflect it (Medicare Economic Index). They
can result in a cost prohibitive burden upon government resouces
(dairy price support parity) if improperly Formulated. Finally,
23
in the case of Federal pay, sector specific indexes are not as
familiar to law-makers as accepted economic indexes such as CPI
and are used as loose guidelines rather than multipliers due to
this lack of credibility.
It is interesting to note that for each of the two sectors
of Federal government activity examined thus far, there is an
overwhelming preference for a certain type of index within
each sector. The Federal benefit and social services sector
utilizes the CPI, while the Federal purchase programs sector
utilizes sector specific indexes exclusively. The third sector
to be examined uses both types of indexes.
E. SECTOR: REGULATORY PROGRAMS
Indexing has made little headway within Federal regulatory
programs [Ref. 113. There seems, however, to be significant
reason for its use. Most regulatory programs are tied to
specific dollar amounts. The problem most of these regulatory
provisions face is best explained in R. Kent Weaver's words:
In a world of stable prices, it is hard to imagine that
Congress would require funding for some programs to fall
automatically every year, by some amount unknowable in
advance, unless Congress intervened annually to prevent it.
But when prices are not stable, that is precisely what happens
to programs in the absence of indexing. At least in theory,
indexing simply maintains real expenditures in the face of
an unpredictable, unlegislated event: inflation. [Ref. 4:p.
43
Examples of regulatory programs defined by specific dollar
amounts and not indexed abound. The Federal procurement small
purchase dollar thresholds are one example. In 1864, Congress
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limited attorney's fees in claims For veteran's benefits to a
maximum of ten dollars. That dollar limit remains in effect
today EReF. 12:p. 13. The Davis-Bacon Act of 1935 requires
that employees on Federally funded construction projects be paid
the "prevailing wage" For that type of work in the local
community. The dollar threshold For contracts covered under the
Act was established at S2,O00, a Figure unchanged until the 1988
budget submission proposed increasing the threshold [ReF. 13).
Finally, an attempt was made to index the minimum wage to the
CPI in 1977 tReF. 14:p. 33. The indexing provision gained the
support of the Carter administration as well as the congressional
committees with jurisdiction over the measure. However, the
legislation Failed to pass the Full membership vote. This,
despite the fact that Australia and New Zealand indexed their
minimum wage in 1914 and a number of industrialized nations have
done so in the intervening years [ReF. 1S:p. 22).
Regulatory programs which have been indexed are relatively
Few. Federal campaign expenditure limits were indexed to the
CPI in 1974. The Supreme Court ruled in Buckley versus Ualleo
that the regulatory provision could only be applied to those
presidential candidates who accept public Financing For their
campaigns. Congress was therefore exempted From the provision.
Railroad rate regulation was tied to an index of railroad
costs in 1980. Indexing resolved the almost continuous cry
of the railroad, and before deregulation, of the trucking and
airline industries, For across-the-board rate increases. These
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requests were very repetitive and disruptive and they generally
ended with the industries obtaining needed inflation
adjustments. [Ref. 4:p. Si]
A final example of a regulatory program that has been
indexed is the natural gas industry. In i78, prices for
several categories of natural gas were indexed to the GNP
deflator. This National Gas Policy Act extended for a specified
period of time and expired in 1984.
Within the Federal regulatory program sector, one program
is indexed to the CPI, one to a specific sector index, and the
third to the GNP deflator. These indexing programs have proven
successful thus far. Yet the vast majority of Federal regulatory
programs with specific dollar thresholds remain unindexed.
Indexing these programs ". . .appears to have great potential to
cut down on repetitive worklnad and to allow regulators and
legislators to avoid making unpopular decisions explicitly by
allowing increases to go into effect automatically." [Ref. 4:p.
S13
The next chapter will analyze the types of indexes and the
legislative aspects of the indexation process discussed here for
application to indexing the small purchase procurement
thresholds within the Federal government.
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IU. ANALYSIS
A. FRAMEWORK: THE FOUR HURDLES
R. Kent Weaver's book, Automatic Government: The Politics of
Indexation, states that ". . .indexing proposals must clear a
common set of hurdles to win adoption. Four hurdles emerge as
critical to the enactment of any indexing proposal." [Ref 4:p.
2123 These hurdles include: establishing an advocacy,
demonstrating the plausibility of indexing, creating a
constituency, and obtaining concurrence of policymakers. Each
of Weaver's four hurdles will be discussed and then applied to
the indexing of the small purchase thresholds for Federal
government procurement.
B. HURDLE ONE: ESTABLISH AN ADUOCACY
Hurdle I is establishing a base of support among
participants in the policy process. Some individuals or
groups must view indexing as being in their own policy or
political interests and must be willing to expend the
resources needed to get the issue on the agenda and gain
the support of others. [Ref. 4:p. 212)
The October 17, 1990 conference committee press release For the
Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act devotes five
of its ten pages to procurement issues [Ref. 16:pp. 1- 10).
"Think smarter, not richer" is both the theme and title of the
fifth section of the press release, which outlined congressional
mandates designed to simplify defense acquisition. Several of
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the provisions are applicable to the issue of indexing the small
purchase thresholds.
First, the Act authorized the use of simplified purchase
procedures for overseas purchases under S100,000 in connection
with Operation Desert Shield. The current simplified purchase
procedures threshold is S25,000, as established in 19B2.
Second, the Act directed the Department of Defense to cut
the acquisition workforce by 20 percent over the next five
years. At the same time, the Act required the Defense
Department to create an Acquisition Corps to provide improved
training, education, and career advancement for the defense
acquisition workforce. Finally, under the heading "Reduce
Micromanagement", the Act repealed the requirement for 62
recurring procurement reports required by law from DoD (about
40 percent of the total number within the Armed Services
Committees' Jurisdiction).
Think smarter, not richer. Do more with less. The mandate
is clear. The issue of Defense procurement has been on the
Congressional agenda for the last several years. Both the Grace
and Packard Commission reports recommended that defense
acquisition be simplified. The adverse publicity generated by
Operation Ill Wind resulted in the Congressional requirement for
a Defense Management Review CDMR) to evaluate the defense
acquisition process with a view toward streamlining by
recommending regulations for revision or cancellation. The
DMR is still in progress. Therefore, a base of support for
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defense procurement revision exists both in Congress and within
the Department of Defense.
Weaver's First hurdle can be overcome by supporters of
indexation of the small purchase procurement thresholds if
advantage is taken of the current support For Defense
Acquisition reform.
C. HURDLE TWO: PLAUSIBILITY OF INDEXING
Hurdle II is establishing the plausibility of indexing-
proponents must be able to give a respectable argument in
policy terms for making automatic adjustments in the program.
If an indexing proposal cannot pass this minimal good-policy
test, it is not likely aven to make it onto government's
agenda. [Ref. 4:p. 2123
According to Weaver, establishing the plausibility of an
indexing proposal involves two distinct steps. First, indexing
must be proven a viable solution to the policy problem. "This is
easiest where program standards are set in nominal dollar terms
by statute and thus become distorted over time." [ReF. 4:p.
213)
The small purchase procurement dollar thresholds are set in
nominal dollar terms. They have been revised at irregular
intervals and currently, the non-competitive threshold of
51,000, established by Congress, has been circumvented by FAR
deviation to 52,SOO. Congress, in the 1991 National Defense
Authorization Act, acknowledged the restrictiveness of the
$25,000 simplified small purchase threshold by increasing
it to S100,000 for the critical Operation Desert Shield.
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The small purchase thresholds are currently distorted. The
"quick Fixes" offered by the FAR deviation and line item
Congressional Authorization will not solve the basic problem of
stating the thresholds in nominal dollar values, since the
"quick Fixes" must be repeated over and over. Indexing will
provide a constant adjustment of these nominal dollar value
thresholds in response to changing economic conditions.
Although Yimited use of indexing has been accomplished
within the regulatory sector of Federal government activity, the
Few programs which have been indexed have proven successful
(see Chapter III). Weaver explains, "Once indexing has been used
successfully For several programs within a sector and
specialists have become familiar with it, they are more likely
to consider it as an option in additional programs." [ReF. 4:p.
2133
Therefore, indexing the small purchase procurement thresholds
is a reasonable response to the problem oF the devaluation of
the nominal dollar value thresholds by inflation. The First
step oF the second hurdle can be achieved by the small purchase
procurement thresholds indexing proposal.
The second step in overcoming the second hurdle is to
establish the plausibility of the specific indexing proposal.
An indexing proposal consists of two main components: the




Weaver states, "Obviously the more familiar the indexing
linkage being considered, the more likely the proposal is to
clear the plausibility threshold." [Ref. l:p. 2133 From
examination of currently indexed programs in Chapter III,
the CPI, sector specific indexes and the GNP deflator emerge as
the three indexes which have been utilized in the past and are
therefore familiar to legislators. Which of these indexes is
most appropriate for the small purchase procurement thresholds?
Sector specific indexes, designed for indexing specific
programs, lack credibility. Unlike the CPI, which has a known
"track record" and is perceived to be politically neutral,
specialized indexes ". . .are often viewed with suspicion by
legislators and clienteles as subject to manipulation." [Ref.
17:pp. 1948-93 Sector specific indexes, such as the salary
survey index used with the Federal civil service program, are
often used as guidelines rather than formulas For indexation
due to a lack of confidence in their impartiality. While the
NATO procurement thresholds are tied to the same civil service
wage index as that of our Federal system, the application of
that index is Far different. Due to the arbitrary treatment of
the civil service wage index by both the executive and
legislative branches within the United States, it is no longer a
true reflection of economic change within the marketplace. For
this reason, the Federal civil service salary index is not
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considered an appropriate index for the Federal small purchase
procurement thresholds.
A military procurement index could be developed with a
marketbasket of goods representative of military requirements.
This index would be similar to the CPI but targeted for a
specific military consumer. Within the small purchase
environment, the Defense Department procures food, office and
other equipment, consumable supplies, and spare parts. Rental
of housing, equipment, and construction and technical services
are also acquired through use of small purchase procedures. The
military procures items in almost every segment of the
marketplace. TIe CPI is a general market index with a
marketbasket of goods which includes both purchase and rental
costs for items in the marketplace. The development of a
specific military procurement index would, therefore, seem a
duplication of the CPI. Additionally, according to Weaver,
.proliferation of specialized indexes such as a
specialized CPI for the elderly should be avoided." [Ref. 4:p.
26LJ
Due to the lack of credibility of sector specific indexes
and the dubious benefit of devising a specific military
procurement index, a sector specific index would be
inappropriate for the small purchase procurement thresholds.
The GNP deflator index evaluates the effects of inflation
on the economy as a whole. While it reflects changes in the
marketplace, it also encompasses many other economic factors,
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such as productivity. These other factors are not applicable
for indexing a program that is solely concerned with the cost
of items in the marketplace. For this reason, an index which
concentrates on the changing costs of goods in the marketplace,
rather than on economic change as a whcLe, is more appropriate as
an index for the Federal small purchase procurement thresholds.
The CPI is an index which satisfies this requirement.
Despite shortcomings, the CPI is used in the vast majority of
federally indexed programs. Therefore, it is a familiar index.
The CPI specifically targets the inflationary impact on the
small purchase procurement thresholds; loss of buying power in
the marketplace. Therefore, the CPI is an appropriate index for
the small purchase procurement thresholds. Using the CPI also
ensures that a program will be treated consistent with other
indexed programs. This would protect the small purchase
procurement thresholds from the arbitrary increases which would
occur if the thresholds were indexed to the Federal civil
service salary index (see Chapter III) or any other sector
specific index.
The CPI is the most appropriate, familiar index for use
with the small purchase procurement thresholds. Now that the
index has been determined, the indexing mechanism for the
prograi must be developed.
2. The Indexing Mechanism
Two thresholds are currently regulated within the
Federal procurement system: non-competitive small purchase and
33
the small purchase threshold. LCDR Howard recommended that the
non-competitive small purchase threshold be tied to the small
purchase threshold by a percentage ratio. [Ref. 1:pp. 45- 463
This recommendation is in consonance with the indexing mechanism
currently used by NATO (see Chapter II). Table IV.1 illustrates
the percentage ratio between the thresholds over the last SO
years.
TABLE IU.1
PERCENTAGE RATIO OF THRESHOLDS
YEAR NON-COMPETITIUE SMALL PURCHASE PERCENTAGE
1SiS 52S0 51,000 2S
1958 S250 S2,500 10
1974 S500 510,000 5
1982 S1,000 525,000 4
1987 52,500 $25,000 10
The indexing mechanism should use 1987 (the last year a
revision was made to the thresholds) as the base year. Since
the Defense Department has been utlizing the 52,S00 threshold
For non-competitive small purchase for the last three years, the
indexing mechanism should use that figure as the base rather
than the $1,000 threshold last legislated by Congress. For
28 of the last SO years the percentage ratio has been ten
percent or greater. Establishing the ratio at ten percent is
realistic. Proposing a higher ratio will entail lengthy
Justification of the benefits, while a ten percent ratio is a
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significant improvement over the current legislated ratio
of four percent.
The mechanism should adjust the thresholds retroactively
to compensate For the loss of buying power from 1987 to the
present and then annually to prevent further loss of buying
power. All other Federal programs indexed to the CPI are
adjusted annually, so an annual adjustment of the small purchase
procurement thresholds would be apprupriately Familiar. The
mechanism should automatically adjust the thresholds at the same
rate as other programs indexed to the CPI such as Social
Security, unless the Congress specifically precludes adjustment
in its Defense Authorization Act.
This mechanism provides favorable responses to some
potential questions legislators may have concerning indexing
proposals. As summarized by Weaver, these questions include:
Do the particular base and index make sense? The CPI is
an appropriate and Familiar index for this proposal as discussed
earlier. The base year is relatively recent, which minimizes
the initial impact of indexation on the thresholds. It also
provides Congressional approval of a non-competitive small
purchase threshold two and one half times greater than that last
legislated, but equal to the threshold currently used by the
Defense Department. A return to the 1982 levels would degrade
the non-competitive small purchase threshold.
Are there safeguards against unanticipated adverse
consequences of the indexing proposal? The mechanism allows the
3S
Congress to Freeze the thresholds at any time through
legislation if they deem appropriate. Most adverse consequences
concerning indexed programs relate to uncontrollable Fund
expenditure. The indexation proposal For small purchase
procurement thresholds does not involve Funding levels For
military procurement or the budget. The thresholds determine the
means by which appropriated Funds are spent. This proposal
is an execution rather than a budgetary issue. The adverse
consequences of this proposal would not result in an increase in
Federal expenditures.
From the discussion, the plausibility of an indexing
proposal For the Federal small purchase procurement thresholds
can be established. Therefore, the proposal has passed the
second of Weaver's Four hurdles.
D. HURDLE THREE: CREATE A CONSTITUENCY
Hurdle III is tailoring proposals to index to make them
compatible with clientele interests or building enough support
among policymakers to overcome clientele opposition. This
test is much more concrete than the second one, for client
groups are very concerned about the specifics of the base to
be indexed and the mechanism used. [ReF. 4:p. 213)
The clientele for the small purchase procurement indexing
proposal is the DoD acquisition workforce. The indexing proposal
will benefit acquisition personnel by reducing solicitation
costs, decreasing requirements for price and cost analysis, and
reducing labor and other support costs [ReF. 1:p. 443. An
increase in the small purchase procurement thresholds due to
indexing will also improve the productivity of government
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personnel. With the decrease in the acquisition workforce
mandated by Congress, the same number of procurement actions
could be accomplished with fewer personnel [ReF. 1:p. 45].
Indexing the small purchase procurement thresholds is
therefore in the clientele's interest. The increase From $1,000
to $2,500 was in fact requested by a Defense Department activity
(see Chapter I).
The base from which the indexing should be accomplished is
also a clientele concern. The current non-competitive threshold
is 52,500 as established by the FAR deviation. In contrast,
Drs. Robert Williams and U. Sagar Bakshi studied the
non-competitive threshold within the commercial sector. The
study, conducted under the auspices of the Defense Systems
Management College, found that 40 percent of the participants
reported a non-competitive threshold averaging $15,000 or more
[Ref. 18:p. 41]. While the Department of Defense may desire a
base more comparable to the commercial sector, the cost of
competing small requirements must continually be weighed against
the public trust in the government, especially DoD, as a prudent
and impartial manager of public funds. The S2,500 threshold
ensures that the Department of Defense benefits from the
indexing proposal and it represents a significant increase from
the Congressionally legislated threshold of 51,000. Until the
Defense Department can quantitatively Justify a higher
threshold, increasing it in the indexing proposal stretches the
bounds of reasonableness. As pointed out by Mollie Orshansky, a
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Social Security Administration statistician who developed the
poverty line bass,". . .the poverty line we've developed did not
come from God. It came from me." [Ref. 1S:p. 11753
The third hurdle then can be crossed. The clientele support
the indexing proposal as in their best interest, and while a
larger base may be preferred, the base of $2,500 is supportable
both quantitatively and logically.
E. HURDLE FOUR: CONCURRENCE OF POLICYMAKERS
Hurdle IV is making a proposal to index consistent with the
political interests of policymakers who have the power to
advance or block it. This last hurdle is in fact a series
of barriers, usually involving, at a minimum, legislative
specialists, chamber majorities in both houses of Congress,
and the President. Failure at one of these barriers is
sufficient to stop a change in policy. [Ref. 4:p. 2123
The true test of the Fourth hurdle is attempted enactment
of the indexing proposal as a legislative bill. It is only with
passage of legislation indexing a program that t s hurdle is
truly crossed. Weaver points out several major obstacles
confronting indexation of regulatory programs within the
legislative arena.
First, under the Reagan administration, indexation was
viewed unfavorably due to an increasing interest in reducing
the budget deficit. The Reagan administration continually
opposed indexation leading to undefined increases in Federal
expenditures. This concern does not apply to the small purchase
procurement threshold indexing proposal because it does not
3B
index Federal expenditure. It only affects execution of
Congressionally appropriated funds.
Second, for those regulations written in nominal dollar
amounts, there are usually participants with an interest in
preventing the standards from keeping up with inflation. In the
small purchase procurement threshold scenario, the Defense
Department is interested in increasing the thresholds. Congress
is also interested in streamlining the Defense Acquisition
process and reducing its micromanagement of the process to
improve functioning. Indexing the thresholds would accomplish
this intent within the small purchase arena.
Lobbyists from industry and organized labor who were
interested in preventing the indexation of the Davis-Bacon Act
(see Chapter III) would be uninterested in the small purchase
procurement thresholds because indexing the thresholds would
neither increase nor decrease the amount of funds which the
Department of Defense would spend in the private sector.
Therefore, there are no visible special interest groups which
would oppose the indexation.
Finally, as Weaver points out, ". . .the growth of indexing
in the regulatory sector often coincides with a movement toward
deregulation." [Ref. 4:p. 2413 The Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 Csee Chapter III) were
initial steps toward the deregulation of certain economic
sectors. The Congressional request for a Defense Management
Review to identify regulatory provisions which are redundant,
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unneccessarw, or so restrictive as to require revision shows an
intent by Congress to lessen its death grip on the Defense
Acquisition process to improve its functioning. The DMR can be
loosely interpreted as a movement by Congress toward lessening
the regulation of Defense Acquisition. Therefore, the indexing
proposal for the small purchase procurement thresholds seems
appropriate and stands a reasonable chance of achieving the
fourth hurdle.
The next chapter will present recommendations and
conclusions from the research.
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U. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to develop a proposed
legislative bill to index the Federal small purchase procurement
thresholds. The proposed legislation can be found in Appendix
A. The principal conclusions and recommendations of this study
are presented below.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Consumer Price Index is the most appropriate index
For the Federal small purchase procurement thresholds. This
index is both familiar to legislators and targets the
impact of encomic changa C1 the marketplace. Use of the CPI
will also ensure that small purchase procurement thresholds
will be treated consistent with other Federally indexed
programs.
2. The indexing proposal for the small purchase procurement
thresholds appears capable of overcoming the four hurdles
to indexation established by R. Kent Weaver. The proposal
to index is plausible, the current political environment
of Defense Management Review supports reform, the clientele
probably supports indexation and the proposal will not
increase Federal spending.
3. Indexing the Federal small purchase procurement thresholds
is likely to improve the productivity of government
personnel. In 1986, over 98 percent of all Department of
Li1
Defense procurement actions fell within small purchase
procurement thresholds ERef. 23. Indexing these thresholds
will allow procurement specialists to process more
requirements in a cost effective and timely manner.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The base Wear from which the small purchase procurement
thresholds should be indexed is 1987. This is the year in
which the Assistant Secretary of Defense CP&L) approved a
class deviation to the FAR establishing the non-competitive
small purchase threshold at $2,500.
2. The non-competitive small purchase threshold should be set
at a fixed rate of ten percent of the simplified procedure
small purchase threshold, currently $25,000. This would
result in a non-competitive small purchase threshold of
$2,S00, equal to that approved by the ASD CF&L) but not yet
ratified by Congress.
3. The indexing proposal should be incorporated into the
Defense Management Review as a mechanism for streamlining
the acquisition process. The indexing proposal will not
only improve the productivity of defense acquisition






To index the non-competitive small purchase and simplified
procedure small purchase thresholds in Federal acquisition.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as tha "Federal Acquisition Small
Purchase Thresholds Improvements Act".
SECTION 2. SIMPLIFIED PURCHASE PROCEDURES.
(a) SIMPLIFIED PURCHASE PROCEDURES.--SECTION 2304 (g) 2
and 3 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:
(2) For the purposes of this chapter, a small purchase is
a purchase or contract for an amount which does not exceed the
dollar figure obtained after applying the Consumer Price Index
to $2S,OOO. The non-competitive small purchase threshold shall
not exceed one-tenth of the above amount.
(3) A proposed purchase or contract for an amount above
the small purchase threshold may not be divided into parts




The Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy
shall promulgate regulations to implement this Act not later
than one Wear after the date of enactment of this Act. The
indexation provision shall be applied retroactive to 1987.
SECTION 4. EFFECTIUE DATES.
This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment.
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